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Abstract: 
The importance of the military as a police model in the U.S. had been eliminated, for the 
most part, from criminal justice and police studies until the 1980s-1990s, even as the 
professional model was studied extensively. The military, however, had been a strong 
presence since at least the turn of the last century. As reformers from that time began to 
fight against machine rule in city after city, they often adopted the military paradigm as 
their police model, and sought those with military backgrounds to head police 
departments. The new mayor of Philadelphia chose a Marine Brigadier General, 
Smedley D. Butler, to head his Department of Public Safety. Butler has become the 
prime example of the military model gone to extreme. But, while the military model per 
se has been replaced by the professional model, much of its underlying understanding of 
police practice has been incorporated into American policing today. 
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Introduction 
The importance of the military as a police model in the U.S. had been eliminated, for the 
most part, from criminal justice and police studies until the 1980s-1990s, even as the 
professional model was studied extensively. At that time several scholars began to 
analyze the state of police activities with regard to the military as something new, mainly 
confined to the integration of military hardware and tactics into police SWAT units.2 The 
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military, however, had been a strong, if not academically discernible, presence since at 
least the turn of the last century. As reformers from that time began to fight against 
machine rule3 in city after city, they often adopted the military paradigm as their police 
model, and sought those with military backgrounds to head police departments.4  
 
Smedley D. Butler, an active Brigadier General in the Marine Corps, was one of a 
number of military and ex-military men who were chosen for this purpose. Others 
included Theodore Roosevelt of New York City, General Francis V. Greene of New York, 
Colonel James W. Everington of Los Angeles, and Major Metellus L. C. Funkhouser of 
Chicago. This article examines Butler’s tenure as an example of the military model of 
police reform, as he was one of the few to take the model to its logical, even excessive, 
conclusion.  
 
Butler’s militarisation of the Philadelphia police got underway at the beginning of January 
1924 when he was sworn in as head of the Department of Public Safety. The new mayor, 
W. Freeland Kendrick, wanted a strong figure to clean up the department and Butler fit 
his criteria. His decision to pick Butler was based on his desire to reinforce his reform 
credentials. While Kendrick ran on a reform agenda, his background was as a prominent 
member of the Philadelphia machine. In fact, it was because of its support that he won 
the mayoralty. With this history, many Philadelphians thought his pledges to clean up the 
city were hollow.5  
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Butler was one of the most decorated soldiers in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps, 
and was in line to become its commander. At 42, he was a veteran of 14 campaigns and 
held both the Navy Distinguished Service Medal and two Congressional Medals of 
Honor. He had fought in the Spanish-American War and the Boxer Rebellion, and had 
seen action in Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and Mexico, and was to be promoted to Major 
General that April. Theodore Roosevelt had named Butler as the consummate soldier.6  
 
At first, Butler was not sure he wanted the position. He was not interested in politics, and 
definitely did not want to resign from the Marine Corps. He made it clear to Kendrick that 
he was a Marine first, and would only consider taking the position if ordered to by his 
superiors, in this case the President of the U.S. and the Secretary of the Navy, as he had 
no intention of asking for a leave of absence. Kendrick took a delegation to Washington 
and was able to persuade the president.7 
 
As a military man high up in the Marine command structure, Butler was used to 
unrestricted power. In no uncertain terms, he told Kendrick that he would not accept the 
position as Head of Public Safety if he got anything less. He was concerned, with good 
reason, that the two main political bosses of Philadelphia, Congressman William S. Vare 
and President of the City Council Charles B. Hall, would block any reform efforts he 
would try to incorporate. Butler could not believe that the machine would allow the police 
to be separated from politics. But Kendrick assured Butler that while his fears had merit, 
he, Kendrick, would be a solid supporter of Butler and run interference for him.8 
 
This turned out to be a promise Kendrick could not keep. He not only could not control 
the hostility between the machine politicians and Butler, which played out in the press, 
but he had his own problems with the Marines. The Council, under the leadership of 
Hall, held the purse strings for the Department of Public Safety, which meant it could 
stop or delay the implementation of Butler’s projects. Vare had control of many 
magistrates, which caused Butler headaches especially with respect to his vice raids. 
While Butler closed speakeasies and saloons, and arrested hundreds during his vice 
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raids, magistrates failed to sustain the charges. These became major problems, not only 
between Butler and the machine, but also between him and the public, and consequently 
him and Kendrick. 
 
1 The Philadelphia Department of Public Safety 
The history of the department gave credence to Butler’s opinion. During the nineteenth 
century, millions of impoverished, illiterate, and unskilled Europeans immigrated to the 
United States, often settling in large cities like Philadelphia, forming ethnic enclaves. The 
private sector offered little to these newcomers in the way of job opportunities, so many 
sought and found work in the newly forming city bureaucracies such as police and fire 
bureaus within Departments of Public Safety. There were no qualifications necessary to 
become a policeman. The men were not given any schooling in the law, nor training after 
they were hired.9 The most defining feature of the American police, through the first third 
of the twentieth century, was their relationship to local political machines. It was the 
police who controlled the polls at election time, and who were the bag men for their 
superiors. As far as machine politicians were concerned, the police were a legitimate 
and integral part of ward politics. This belief manifested itself every time there was a 
political turnover, which caused a substantial, if not a complete, change in police 
department personnel.10  
 
Philadelphia was a prime example of the police-ward connection. It was a highly 
decentralized city, run along ward lines. Police districts had been constructed to 
correspond exactly with political wards. As long as district captains deferred to their ward 
leaders, they were protected. The Director of Public Safety had no power against this 
arrangement, and was usually a machine appointee himself. The machine controlled not 
only the Department of Public Safety, however, it also held sway over many of the other 
institutions that ran the city and the criminal justice system such as the civil service 
commission, the police board, the city council, the mayor’s office and the prosecutor’s 
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office.11  
 
There has always been a question about just what the duties of the police should be, 
even after reform.12 In the nineteenth century, it was generally accepted that one of the 
primary functions of the police was the maintenance of public order. Aside from that 
there was little consensus. As departments developed, they became involved in a wide 
range of activities including: street cleaning, inspecting boilers, investigating vegetable 
markets, operating emergency ambulances, and licensing saloons, restaurants, masque 
balls and lodging houses. Often they were in charge of dog catching and the pound, the 
censorship of movies, licensing junk gatherers, newsboys and peddlers, and performing 
the duties of sealer of weights and measures. Fundamental to all these activities, 
besides that of order maintenance, was one common principle: they were to be a 
reactive, not a proactive, force. It was the duty of the police to respond to complaints or 
requests for assistance, not to seek out infractions. Urban police departments were 
responsive, catchall agencies.13 
 
The Philadelphia Department of Public Safety in 1923 was no exception. Defined in the 
Bullitt Bill of 1885, it was in charge of ‘the care, management, administration and 
supervision of the police affairs, and all matters relating to the public health, to the fire 
and police force, fire alarm telegraph, erection of fire escapes, and the inspection of 
buildings and boilers, markets and food sold therein.’14 This paralleled the myriad of 
professional backgrounds from which the men who made up the Philadelphia police 
came before they decided to go into policing. These included shipbuilding, carpet 
making, musician, tree culturist, electrician, trolley conductor, and undertaker.15  
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2 Police Reform and The Progressive Era   
The movement for police reform was part of the larger Progressive Era’s push to 
eradicate what many considered to be society’s ills. The people who belonged to this 
movement mostly came from the middle-class and had observed the results of 
unrestrained capitalism during the Gilded Age.  
 
While the historiography of the Progressive Era has been replete with examples of the 
disparity among progressives and progressive groups, to the extent that some historians 
despaired of calling it a movement,16 historian Glen Gendzler posits that people would 
not have called themselves progressive if there were not a unifying concept that 
connected them. He points out that progressives rejected the conservative principle of 
individualism inherent in the Gilded Age’s embrace of social Darwinism and free market 
capitalism. They especially abhorred the hypocrisy evident in the conservative position 
to refuse state interference on the part of the lower- and lower-middle classes, for 
example, workers, immigrants, and the poor, and on issues such as the environment and 
urban planning, while supporting it to further the power of corporations through such acts 
as excise taxes, eminent domain, subsidies, and government contracts. Progressives 
did not see how progress would come through the ability of businesses to have free 
reign to do as they pleased. As they understood it, the marketplace was skewed toward 
the powerful, against which the smaller enterprises could not compete.17  
 
Instead, progressives pushed to use state power on behalf of what they considered to be 
the common good. This was a time when the country shifted from the superficial, but 
extreme, political party loyalty of the Gilded Age to a decline in both party identification 
and voting practices. People stopped using political parties to promote their programmes 
and instead, formed many new, independent”pressure groups, such as women’s clubs, 
labour lobbies, civic leagues, and professional associations that focused on particular 
issues. In criminal justice, one of the most famous of these groups was the Chicago 
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Woman’s Club, which established the juvenile court.18  
 
At the same time, local, informal groups, which had been part of the fabric of small town 
American life, morphed into large, bureaucratic, formal organizations. The people who 
comprised these institutions believed in a strong centralized government, and the social 
efficiency of professionally run corporate bureaucracies. The Anti-Saloon League (ASL), 
the national organization dedicated to passing a prohibition amendment, was a 
prominent example of this.19 
 
The progressives were a homogeneous, middle-class, Protestant group. As the cities 
grew, many of them began to yearn for a small-town past that had existed mostly in their 
imaginations. These towns were conceptualized as homogenous villages, where 
everyone knew everyone else, and looked after each other. While small towns still 
existed throughout the country, progressives bemoaned the fact that these traits could 
not be transferred to urban living.20 Actually many of these traits could be found in urban 
immigrant neighbourhoods. But progressives could not transfer their idealized image of 
small-town living to a ‘foreign’ environment. The small-towns they had envisioned were 
based on Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ethics and culture, not the Catholic Italian and Irish, 
eastern European Jewish, and other customs of the immigrant neighbourhoods, which 
did not hold with many of the sumptuary laws, especially that of Prohibition, so dear to 
the progressives’ hearts. They also did not support the urban machines. While 
progressives wanted the state to employ its power on behalf of the people, they 
differentiated between what they defined as the ‘common good’ and state control under 
the corrupt urban bosses.  
 
The state rule many of them envisioned was based on a strict Protestant moral code that 
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prohibited drinking, gambling, prostitution, and Sunday business. Many focused on what 
they defined as a unified public interest, concerned with social reform, social welfare, 
workers’ rights, and the environment. This also led them to the concept of one law for all. 
Others focused on city services, including water, electricity, sanitation, and police, an 
efficiently and professionally run City Hall, and the growth of a merit based city civil 
service and bureaucracy. They placed a great deal of importance on efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, and statistical standards for measuring success.21 
 
The machine, on the other hand, stressed the services it could provide for its 
constituents, mainly immigrants, including finding jobs for people, and interceding with 
legal authorities when these services were not available through the government or 
private business, in return for party loyalty. It also upheld the cultures of the people who 
lived in the neighbourhoods. This included drinking and gambling. Prohibition played a 
significant part in the organization of crime into the national networks needed to ship 
alcohol, store it, and move it around the country. These networks were called crime 
syndicates. Although not as well known as the gangs in Chicago or New York, the 
Philadelphia/New Jersey crime syndicate nexus was a major hub for alcohol 
distribution.22   
 
Butler subscribed to progressive beliefs. He accepted the construct of the social good of 
a centralized government and a hierarchical police bureau. He focused on efficiency and 
the use of technology as major tools in the battle against crime. The way he measured 
his success was by the number of arrests his men made, and they measured in the 
thousands by the time he left office. He also felt he was the man to whip the Philadelphia 
police into shape when others could not.  
 
But the results of the push for a common good often led to the rejection of individual 
rights and freedoms. Under the guise of science, reformers conducted studies that veiled 
ethnic and economic racism, and gender discrimination. While reformers disagreed on 
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many of the reasons that accounted for the dirty streets, crime, fires and a host of other 
city problems that infested the cities, they agreed that a major cause of these problems 
was the influx of foreign immigrants and their refusal to adopt American values and 
attitudes. Some reformers turned to eugenics as scientific proof of racial deficiency. To 
them, the prosperity of America lay in raising the educational, social, and economic 
levels of personnel in municipal administrations and improving the quality of urban 
services.23  
 
To accomplish this, the reformers needed a governmental body that would enforce their 
vision of society. Their answer was to turn to the police and courts. But this would entail 
fundamental shifts in both the composition of the police and their mission. The police 
had to reject being a political arm of the machine and become an objective, independent 
body that was dedicated to the enforcement of the law. This meant an entire revamp of 
the police force according to new military/professional standards. What reformers did not 
acknowledge was that their idea of law enforcement was just as politically based as the 
machine’s.24  
 
3 Police Models 
Reformers concentrated on two police models: the professional and the military.25 The 
professional model, which came to prominence in the 1920s-1930s, had its roots in the 
Progressive Era, and is heavily identified with August Vollmer. It focused on the 
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educated crime fighter, who both aggressively used science in his pursuit of the criminal, 
and was deeply active in the community. Vollmer instituted the first formal police training 
programme in the country, the Berkeley Police School in 1908. For Vollmer, the ideal 
police officer would be one who already had a college education and who would then be 
further trained in technical skills after induction into the force. For these reasons, he tried 
to attract college-educated men to his department.26  
 
Vollmer’s dedication to science and technology went hand-in-hand with his interest in 
education. He pioneered efforts to use laboratory science to apprehend criminals, 
accepted the social science theories of his day and focused on technological advances 
to increase response time. Early on, he subscribed to the reform position that the police 
should be proactive. He was the first chief to use bicycles and by 1914 had instituted the 
full use of cars. He also installed the first car radio.27  
 
At a time when reformers were trying to gain control of the cities, however, the model 
that most interested them was that of the military. While there was substantial overlap 
between the professional and military models in that both insisted that the police be 
autonomous, be subject to physical requirements, and use the latest technology to 
defeat crime, there was a difference in focus. For the military model, the city and its 
police represented the nation and its standing army. People who broke the law were 
equated to enemies of the state, not citizens, and became persona non grata in their 
own country. To fight these adversaries, the uniformed branch of the police and the 
detectives (the non-uniformed branch) were equated to different services of the military. 
Illegal behaviour was seen as an attack on the American way of life. To save the country, 
the police had to engage in a ‘war on crime.’ Needless to say, many cities began 
recruiting military men to run their departments.28  Reformers then focused on three 
main, related recommendations for structuring the police. First, they wanted to centralize 
police authority and give chiefs a capable staff that was independent and autonomous 
from machine interference. Second, they instituted age and health requirements, martial 
discipline, and physical and educational exams, as it was vital to change the job from 
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one of patronage to one of merit. Third, they narrowed the police function to focus on law 
enforcement and the war on crime.29  
 
Butler did his best to implement these fundamental changes through many 
unconventional and innovative plans. But the result was not what he expected. He did 
not get a unified military force ready to do battle for the soul of Philadelphia. Instead, the 
rank-and-file remained part of the machine. As soon as Butler left Philadelphia, the 
bureau reverted back to its old ways. Only three years later, in 1928, a Special Grand 
Jury was convened to address major police corruption and collaboration with 
bootleggers and local politicians. Butler believed in the letter of the law whether or not it 
was a good law, and whether or not it could be enforced. His bad luck was that he 
agreed to serve as Head of Public Safety in the middle of Prohibition. Butler himself did 
drink upon occasion, but he pledged to uphold the prohibition laws. Most of 
Philadelphia’s constituents did not. They and the rank-and-file fought him at every turn 
as they sabotaged his plans as best they could and retained their connections to ward 
bosses, bootleggers, and crime syndicates. 
 
It also turned out that Butler did not have the luxury of time as Kendrick dismissed him 
after his second year on the job. Almost from the beginning, the two clashed. Butler, a 
publicity hound, became the darling of the reform press, which did not sit well with 
Kendrick. Added to this was Butler’s lack of political acumen. Kendrick knew the 
machine politicians well as he had been one of them and did not want to antagonize 
anyone he did not have to. In the end, his attempt to straddle the political middle did not 
work, and Butler’s lack of diplomatic insight made Kendrick’s position even weaker. The 
final straw came when Butler raided a Christmas party in the Ritz Carlton Hotel for 
prominent Philadelphians. The outcry from this was insurmountable. Kendrick fired 
Butler and appointed the Assistant Director of Public Safety to the position. 
 
Butler’s First Month 
The first month Smedley D. Butler was the Director of the Department of Public Safety, 
he reorganized the police bureau, conducted several 48 hour long raids on vice, which 
resulted in the closure of 75 percent of Philadelphia’s saloons, demoted, suspended and 
promoted officers, began training and equipping his force, introduced new physical, 
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mental and age requirements, and addressed salary increases under a merit system of 
advancement. It was a busy time. He also selected George W. Elliott to be the Assistant 
Director of Public Safety, the second highest position in the department. Elliott had been 
Fire Marshall in the Department of Public Safety under the previous three 
administrations and had not been active in politics. He then asked all other bureau 
heads to submit their resignations, except Superintendent William B. Mills, the current 
head of the police bureau. At this point, he announced that he and Elliott were to be 
considered equals, which effectively split the department in two. This enabled him to 
focus solely on the police, while allotting the rest of the department to Elliott: fire, 
electrical, elevators, and boiler and buildings inspection. 30  
 
On 8 January both Butler and Kendrick spoke before Philadelphia’s uniformed 
policemen. As the Philadelphia North American phrased it, ‘General Butler paid the men 
before them [Butler and Kendrick] the highest compliment he could by talking to them 
like Marines.’ In fact, what he said was:  
I was told a month or so ago that it wasn’t worth while to talk to you; that when I 
saw you I would see you weren’t like marines. I was told that you wouldn’t 
understand and that you were not that kind of men, but, by God, you are. I don’t 
believe you are crooked. I won’t believe it. There have been conditions 
surrounding you under which nobody could get away with the situation and make 
it run.31  
 
While he was praising his men, however, he was not putting them on the honour system. 
He had a newly formed squad of 300 trusted men who were to act as spies on their 
fellow police officers. The reform-oriented news media considered this a highly positive 
step. While they agreed that informers were not usually among the most popular men on 
the force, in this instance, they said, it should be considered different because 
Philadelphia was now like a country at war and Butler’s trusted men were compared to 
wartime spies.32  
 
4 Police as Marines 
Butler envisioned the Philadelphia police as a miniature Marine Corps. This meant he 
wanted them free of machine interference; he wanted them younger and able-bodied; he 
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wanted them in uniform; and he wanted them trained.33 
 
Age and Physical Requirements 
To upgrade the force, Butler adopted the Marine Corps principles in hiring. The average 
age of a Marine was 21 while that of a Philadelphia police officer was in the 50s. For the 
force to be lean and ready, this had to change. To do this, Butler initiated a high physical 
standard for the men, which would help eliminate the older men, supplemented with 
periodic examinations to ensure compliance.34 To get started on this, Butler ordered his 
lieutenants to report who in their districts were unfit for service. In a force of 
approximately 3,500, the lieutenants listed around 700 men. Butler then had these men 
take a physical examination, which consisted of testing their lungs, hearts, vision, and 
hearing. They were then asked to walk rapidly up and down a hallway. After these basic 
exercises, almost all were deemed unfit for an eight-hour patrol.35 As a result, 500 of the 
700 men tested were dropped from the force. Then that April, he reduced the age limit 
for police applicants from 38 to 30. At that time, over 600 men were over the age of 60.36 
 
Uniforms  
Police uniforms had been a contentious issue for many years. In the early years of the 
country, Americans saw their Revolution as a fight between power (the British) and 
liberty (the American ideal). For them, the British army of redcoats personified this 
power, and the American fight to maintain independence depended on vigilance against 
this power’s infringement. To the American public, even 100 years later, a police force 
that resembled a standing army, symbolised by a uniform, was anathema.37  
 
Over time, however, as Philadelphia’s population grew both in numbers and complexity, 
it became apparent that the public needed to be able to identify the police. In 1856, 
Mayor Richard Vaux required all police to wear blue coats and silk hats. He also formed 
a special police unit, the Reserve Corps, and required its members to wear unique 
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uniforms so they would be visually set apart from the regular police. Historian Howard 
states that the uniform was distinctive and military-like, which imparted a look of 
authority, a helpful characteristic in law enforcement. By 1860, all officers wore full 
uniforms.38 
 
In 1884, under Mayor William Burns Smith, the department added a time stripe placed 
above the sleeve cuff. In a major change of direction, the previous military service of the 
officer was displayed as an image of distinction. A red stripe on the blue frock coat 
identified service in the U. S. army or navy. Not as visible, one blue stripe was added to 
indicate each three years of police service. The time when the police considered the 
military repugnant was fading.39  
 
Butler’s predecessors, as Heads of Public Safety, had not worn a uniform, but Butler 
decided early on that he would, and regarded it similarly to his Marine regalia.40 He also 
designed new insignia for himself and his subordinates that were similar to that of the 
Marine Corps. The Director’s insignia became two gold stars, like the two silver stars of 
a Marine Major General (the position Butler was to advance to that April); the Assistant 
Director had one, like the silver star of a Brigadier General; the Superintendent of Police 
a silver eagle, like the silver eagle of a Colonel; and the inspectors gold oak leaves, like 
the Marine Majors’ gold oak leaf. When Butler said he wanted his men to be like 
Marines, he meant it literally.41 
 
Training 
Butler was a man of action who was always in motion and his management style 
reflected this. It was important to him that his men were not only physically fit, but could 
also react to situations with the ability to use the basic technology at hand, and for Butler 
this meant a working knowledge of firearms. Early on he realized this was not the case. 
To rectify the fact that they did not, he mandated a two-week instruction period in pistol 
firing.42  
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Butler also decided to arm all city firemen with .45 caliber revolvers when they were off 
duty. City firemen were already vested with police powers, but Butler felt they could not 
be effective without the proper equipment. Guns, he said, were what firemen needed to 
aid police in their fight against lawlessness and banditry.43  
 
At the same time, Butler abolished the police training school. He believed that an officer 
learned his work on the street, not in a classroom. This was a major departure from the 
professional model, which had as a primary tenet the importance of education. The 
Philadelphia police training school had been initiated during the reform mayoralty of 
Rudolph Blankenburg, 1912-1916, and had served as a model for many police 
departments throughout the country. Police training had consisted of a three-month 
course. Butler considered this unnecessary. Instead, he instituted a policy where new 
policemen were to go immediately onto the force and given booklets that would outline 
their duties. Soldiers learned their skills on the battlefield; the Philadelphia police would 
learns theirs on the streets.44  
 
5 Upholding the American Way of Life 
Prohibition and the blue laws were major tests of the military analogy because 
Americans from all walks of life found themselves on the wrong side of those laws. While 
Prohibition had been instituted as a way to destroy immigrant culture, what it also 
accomplished was to make illegal drinking in mixed company acceptable for the middle- 
and upper-classes. Those who had previously been law-abiding citizens found it exciting 
to go to speakeasies and break laws with which they disagreed. 45  
 
It was Butler’s position that a Marine enforces the law, whether he agrees with it or not, 
and the Philadelphia police would enforce all the prohibition laws to the best of their 
ability. This sentiment clashed forcefully with many of the people of Philadelphia (and 
also many police) when he attempted to prohibit liquor and dancing in hotels, cafés, and 
clubs in Philadelphia. This did not stop him from trying. During his second week in office, 
he stated that dancing in public places must cease at midnight on Saturday, in order to 
observe Sunday closing laws. He made it clear that the owners of the halls would be 
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held accountable, both for the character of the dancing and for the patronage. He kept 
this position throughout his two years in Philadelphia.46  
 
Kendrick realized this would have negative effects on his mayoralty, as many prominent 
Philadelphians invested large amounts of money in these businesses. In an attempt to 
divert what he saw as imminent disaster he asked Butler to meet with these men and 
women, believing Butler could outline his plans and get their cooperation. But Butler was 
too brusque and did not handle the situation well. Instead of coming to some sort of 
compromise with these business people, he approached them as if he were a general 
and informed them that he intended to install a special squad of undercover detectives 
dressed in full evening attire, to police these establishments. This began a two-year 
battle between Bulter and the hospitality industry.47 
 
Butler must have assumed that either the public would support these laws, or that he 
could enforce them against public opinion. What he learned was what many occupying 
armies learned. It is often the oppressed that prevail culturally. Those arrested for liquor 
infractions came before magistrates who often released them for lack of evidence. When 
Butler began padlocking the establishments of persistent liquor violators, judges rejected 
his arguments and allowed the places to reopen.48 He also came to the realization that 
many policemen were in league with bootleggers and regular citizens had their own 
bathroom stills. Most Philadelphians did not want Prohibition and did everything in their 
power to thwart it.49  
 
Enemies of the State 
As a soldier Butler was convinced, as were many reformers during this period, that 
criminal syndicates, most of which were involved in illegal alcohol trafficking, were out to 
undermine the American way of life and destroy its security. This was reinforced by the 
ethnic composition of most criminal organizations, which consisted of immigrant Jews, 
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Irish, and Italians, such as Boo Boo Hoff, Charley Schwartz, Micky Duffy, and the 
Lanzetti brothers. Many reformers used the ‘science of eugenics’ and statistics to ‘prove’ 
their assertions.50 
 
Since Butler viewed the domination of the crime syndicates in Philadelphia as every bit 
as dangerous as foreign combatants to the nation, he decided the problem should be 
treated in a similar manner. This prompted him to offer a promotion to the first officer 
who killed a bandit, with the stipulation that the bandit had to either be engaged in a 
holdup or have a revolver ready for use when pursued. A soldier, he explained, would 
guard a position with a weapon at the ready and use it should the situation warrant it. 
Similarly, he wanted his policemen to guard Philadelphia and use their guns to thwart 
criminals and gang members. He did not understand that it is not allowable for police to 
kill citizens when not faced with lethal danger, or that crime from a city’s citizens is not 
equivalent to a nation under attack from a foreign entity. But many of these criminals 
spoke foreign languages and had different customs and values from his, which probably 
identified them to him as foreign. Butler took this further and stated that, like soldiers, 
those police who killed criminals should not be called upon to either defend themselves 
or to contribute to their defence. ‘A policeman who shoots a bandit is serving his city 
exactly as a soldier when firing at his country’s enemies.’ He saw no difference in 
context between the role of the soldier and that of a police officer.51  
 
Efficiency and Technology  
Herman Goldstein, in his article ‘Improving Policing,’ addressed the problem of 
bureaucracies becoming so absorbed in ways to more efficiently run their organizations 
that they often overlook the reasons they were created in the first place. He labeled this 
the “means over ends” syndrome. This has been especially true of the urban police. 
Goldstein points out that police reformers have been so preoccupied with increasing 
response time, obtaining ever better communications networks, faster cars, and 
updating procedures, that they have lost sight of the specific crimes and disorders the 
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police were meant to address.52  
 
This was evident in Philadelphia. During Prohibition, some of the country’s biggest 
bootleggers lived in the New Jersey/Philadelphia region and were developing nationwide 
syndicates. Cops and political officials were integrally connected with them. In order to 
stop the liquor trafficking, Butler resorted to military technology and a focus on efficiency. 
This included special bandit-chasing armoured automobiles, fortified military-style 
‘outposts’ to chase bandits, a new police district map of police routes to crime scenes, 
and a searchlight signal system. Butler tackled Philadelphia as he would a war-zone. 
 
Like armoured military vehicles for soldiers, Butler felt that armoured automobiles would 
make it possible for police to gun down criminals (the enemy) more efficiently. While 
police vehicles were usually run with two men per car, Butler increased this number to 
four. He felt that the additional men in a car would help if there were a need to get a 
large number of police to a situation quickly and it would aid in shooting. The idea was to 
turn the rear seats back-to-back with the front seats ‘like an artillery limber.’ The men in 
the back seats could then shoot directly at the bandits, without having to turn around. 
Each man in the ‘gunnery squad’ was to be given a rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, and a 
revolver. While these men would not have the same protection as those in the front, who 
were shielded by steel plates and bullet-proof glass windows, this new formation would 
increase police ability to capture bandits.53  
 
Butler also created ‘information booths’ or ‘outposts,’ modeled after military posts, at the 
outskirts of Philadelphia on every one of the 21 major roads out of the city. He furnished 
them with bandit-chasing motorcars and motorcycle policemen. Telephone wire would go 
directly from police headquarters to district stations and these booths. When a 
policeman learned of a holdup, he would report it and the location immediately to City 
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Hall and then to his station house. City Hall would then send word to the other station 
houses, to get their bandit-chasing cars and motorcycle squads to that site. This would 
enable the bandit-chasing cars to mobilize immediately and be after the bandits before 
the bandits could get started.54 
 
To increase police response time even further, Butler divided the city into 50 districts, 
each with a key number. This was also in the interest of police safety. Each man would 
have a fixed route to get to the crime, which would be different from the patrolmen 
assigned to the case, so that every street would be covered. This would form a large 
circle that would tighten around the bandits, making it difficult for them to escape, like a 
military pincher movement. Philadelphia was now an armed, occupied city.55  
 
To further aid in the speed necessary to contact police officers in a timely manner when 
a criminal act occurred, Butler devised several ideas to use streetlights and searchlights. 
Each location was given a code so that when a crime was committed the streetlights 
would signal where the crime was taking place. Policemen would carry codebooks that 
translated the codes so the police would know where to go. Additionally, four huge 
searchlights would be placed under William Penn’s statue on City Hall, and flash the 
licence plate numbers of bandit cars. In case an officer had trouble decoding the flashing 
lights, Butler also decided to place a huge illuminated sign with the licence number on it 
on City Hall. 56 
 
All of these changes garnered Butler a lot of media attention, too much at times. He was 
interested in getting the most publicity possible, and often discussed his plans with 
reporters. His order to ‘kill a bandit, get promoted’ together with his continuous 48 hour 
drives to shut down saloons, gambling hells, and disorderly houses, many of which had 
to be closed multiple times, made headlines, but were gratuitously sensational. This 
practice did not serve him well in the long term with either the mayor or the machine.57  
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6 Butler’s Last Stand 
In October 1925, after Butler was in office for almost two years, Kendrick announced he 
would ask that Butler’s leave of absence be extended for the remainder of Kendrick’s 
term. President Coolidge, however, was not inclined to grant this request. It was his 
position that Butler already had two years to straighten out Philadelphia, and it was time 
for him to return to the Marines. In that case, said Kendrick, he would keep Butler’s 
policies in place and name Assistant Director George W. Elliott as the new head.58  
 
On December 7, Butler announced his intention to continue his ‘military stance’ against 
crime and vice until he left office on December 31, when his military leave expired. Butler 
was slated to take over command of the Marine Corps base in San Diego, CA at that 
time.59 This seemed like a foregone agreement until December 23, when he changed his 
mind and decided to resign from the Marines and stay in Philadelphia, at least until the 
end of the Kendrick administration. Why Butler did this is a mystery. One reason could 
have been that he wanted to irritate Kendrick. Kendrick immediately demanded that 
Butler step down. His public reason was that he did not want a resigned Marine officer in 
his cabinet; he wanted an active Marine. This made as much sense as Butler’s ‘decision’ 
to resign from the Marines. Kendrick accused Butler of treating him disdainfully, knowing 
that he, Kendrick, didn’t want Butler to resign his commission. Underlying this were the 
two contentious years they had just gone through. Kendrick wanted Butler gone. He 
backed up this decision by saying that if Butler wouldn’t step down from his position as 
Director of Public Safety and return to the Marines, he should consider himself fired.60 
Butler continued the insults: 
Why the Mayor does not wish me as a resigned officer is beyond my 
comprehension, as I am the same person. I am being dismissed from public 
service because I am making the greatest sacrifice any Marine can make, and I 
should, without any other ties, be of more service to the city of Philadelphia than I 
was before...The Mayor has suspended me from duty and I will obey his order.61  
  
 
Butler, however, was stretching the truth. At the time he spoke to Kendrick about staying 
he had not yet resigned from the Marines. While he did post his resignation letter later, 
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his friends said he knew that it would not be accepted and was just posturing.62  
 
Interestingly, while the Philadelphia papers had lauded him throughout his tenure, none 
came to his defence now. The New York Times even editorialized that Coolidge had 
been very shrewd to realize that Butler ‘was not saving Philadelphia and his work was 
not reflecting credit on the Marine Corps.’ Rather, having a Senior Marine officer 
outflanked by an urban machine was an ‘indignity.’63 
 
Conclusion: Butler and the Military Paradigm 
Reformers chose the military as their theoretical model because they did not like the 
civilian orientation it had under the machine, which ran it as a political arm of the 
organization. In order to get it out of machine control, most reformers decided the best 
model would be the ‘apolitical’ model of the military.  
 
Butler, however, took this paradigm to its logical extreme, treating his police officers as if 
they were Marines. One reason his tenure did not work out was because the city police 
were not soldiers, criminals were not the enemy, and crime-ridden areas were not at war 
with the cities that encompassed them. In fact, many Philadelphia citizens - hotel and 
club owners, the middle- and upper-middle classes who frequented these 
establishments, saloon owners and their patrons - especially disagreed with his 
enforcement of Prohibition. 
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Butler is a good example to study to learn about the consequences of paradigms, as 
they change our focus and understanding.64 Few people are as dogmatic as Butler was, 
but his example shines a light on unexpected outcomes. When two disparate groups are 
equated, key differences are lost as one group incorporates essential aspects of the 
other. For example, the military language that was used then has come down to the 
present day, so that we now speak about ‘wars’ on just about everything, be it crime or 
cancer or drugs, criminals are often portrayed as enemies of the state, and we have 
SWAT teams as normal police divisions in many urban cities. Thus, while he did not 
have a lasting effect on Philadelphia or its police department he does seem to have 
been a representative precursor of things to come.  
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